dispossessed. Through a rigorous analysis of Occupy Toronto, as well as an illuminating vignette of a neighborhood conflict over a gentrifying San Francisco soccer field, Kohn helps to move the discussion of public space as a site of leisure, consumption, and random encounter to a site of contestation and dissent. Here, I would add that public space is also a site for the construction of public knowledge, and in the tradition of Paolo Freire, can be a tool for cultivating a solidaristic ethos in our cities and unbridling the political and electoral power of the young and the marginalized.

While Kohn also advocates for locally embedded forms of economic activity, such as worker cooperatives, local markets, and community development banks, she thinks that they are "partial" solutions (p. 196). While they serve to mitigate some of the worst effects of "extreme disinvestment" as the top-down public is retreating, she ultimately seeks to transform the structure of capital, and therefore refuses to surrender the power of the state to the winds of austerity. Institutions matter. The bottom-up cannot go it alone. As the radical Left and the radical Right seem to be converging today in their mistrust of government, Kohn demands accountable public institutions and urban policy that can "compel" a reallocation of social property. The greatest appeal of her approach is that it "incorporates both state-directed and more capillary forms of solidarity" (p. 196). I find this convergence hopeful, and a rich terrain for further critical engagement.

The Color of Mind: Why the Origins of the Achievement Gap Matter for Justice. By Derrick Darby and John L. Rury. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018. 224p. $75.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

Common Core: National Education Standards and the Threat to Democracy. By Nicholas Tampio. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018. 216p. $24.95 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718002906

— Emmerich Davies, *Harvard University*

In 1949, T. H. Marshall defended universal education "as the right of the adult citizen to have been educated" (*Marshall Lectures*, 1964, p. 82). He went on to claim that education was a prerequisite for an engaged and free citizenry. It is with this social right that the two texts under review concern themselves. In *The Color of Mind*, Derrick Darby and John L. Rury ask how unequal schooling opportunities have denied African Americans "dignitary justice" through historically racialized practices that continue in ever-changing forms to the present day. In *Common Core*, Nicholas Tampio provides a compelling case for local decision making in the design of education standards, and argues against the centralized standards of the Common Core.

The Color of Mind provides a comprehensive historical account of the construction, emergence, and evolution of a racial ideology that portrayed African Americans as inferior to whites in "intelligence, character, or conduct" (p. 2). Darby and Rury coin this the "Color of Mind." The authors are centrally concerned with closing achievement gaps by addressing this "dignitary injustice" (p. 3). To this end, they aim to put aside concerns around distributive justice (p. 2), as well as that which cannot be changed *outside* of the school building; nevertheless, they return to these issues time and again.

Tracing the emergence of the Color of Mind to Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, the book argues that although this racial ideology does not manifest itself in the same *form* today, it is present in how society and the education system tracks (p. 112), disciplines (p. 118), and diagnoses African American children as requiring special education (p. 122) even now. While the original versions of this ideology maintained that African Americans were not worthy of being educated in the same buildings (p. 45) or in the same subjects as whites (p. 48) in the United States, this evolved through the "cultural turn" in education emerging from the Moynihan Report (p. 81) to classroom practices that continue to stigmatize and discriminate against African American students today (p. 111).

Darby and Rury are not satisfied to merely diagnose historical and contemporary dignitary injustices, however. The authors advocate for a "Color of Mind Index" (p. 150) that would hold teachers and school leaders accountable for perpetuating dignitary injustices within schools. For example, if a school did not have equal proportions of black students in higher track classes, they would be docked on the Color of Mind Index (p. 150). Darby and Rury identify three implications of their argument: Racial desegregation of schools will be insufficient to remedy Color of Mind ideology, fixing problems outside of schools will be by itself insufficient to eliminate Color of Mind ideology within schools, and the measures they advocate do not require a massive outlay of resources (p. 13). In short, the authors believe that we can address dignitary injustice on the cheap. To any scholar of distributive politics, or the politics of education, this immediately raises a number of issues.

The book is quick to identify a litany of problems that happen *outside* of the school setting to which educators need to pay attention if they truly wish to fight for educational equality. These include a lack of support for public education (p. 46), segregation (p. 47), unequal funding (p. 48), outright banning of students from schools (p. 49), voter disenfranchisement (p. 51), segregated housing markets (p. 91), and poverty (p. 125), among others. It is in this diagnosis, however, where the problem emerges. For example, while Darby and Rury argue that residential desegregation will be insufficient to fix Color of

Mind ideology (p. 13), they also provide extensive evidence that residential desegregation contributed to African American educational progress up to the 1970s (p. 93).

It is hard for this reader to understand how we can achieve dignitary justice *inside* of schools without addressing these issues *outside* of schools. The authors label those making such criticisms "integration idealists," and an entire chapter is dedicated to their concerns (Chapter 6), yet those concerns extend to more than integration. What is to happen to African American children when they leave school at the end of the day and are subject to poor-quality public services and discriminatory police practices, and African American adults when they are subject to discriminatory labor markets? Are these not also instances of dignitary injustice? While the authors are right to argue that these are difficult problems for educators to address (pp. 11–12), it is hard to imagine a world where Color of Mind practices *inside of schools* are not affected by discriminatory practices *outside of schools*.

In *Common Core*, political theorist Nicholas Tampio passionately argues for local control of education standards. Inveighing against the design of national education standards in a large, diverse democracy such as the United States (pp. 2, 6, 15), Tampio dissects in great detail the folly of the Common Core across four subjects, English Language Arts (ELA), Math, Science, and History, as well as the teaching of gender and sexuality. His position is not a dispassionate one—his children are currently subject to the standards he writes about—and the personal investment is a refreshing one.

This book owes a great deal to John Dewey and progressive educators (p. 10). It builds a case for local control over education around four claims. First, in a diverse democracy, education standards should reflect this diversity by engaging multiple stakeholders. Second, society *should* be centrally concerned with the organization of schools, and local control is one way to encourage participation in this endeavor. Third, the *form* that current educational standards take, with their excessive focus on testing and rote memorization, "crushes the creativity and entrepreneurship of its young people," (p. 34). Finally, all children deserve the opportunity to engage in more creative forms of learning, and to deny this is inegalitarian (p. 38). In this final argument, *Common Core* has parallels to *The Color of Mind*, where the latter details how the history of American education has often pushed African American children into forms of education like vocational training (p. 52).

Tampio is fair in his critique of national education standards—he dedicates an entire chapter to discussing the arguments presented by their advocates, although it is clear that he is unconvinced by them (Chapter 1). Through a close examination of standards in four subjects—English, math, history, Science–and the teaching of gender and sexuality, he clearly makes his case: Centralized control of education standards and curricula fails when implemented. Whether it is a controversy over what types of history are taught, as was the case in Jefferson County, Colorado (pp. 108–11), or how the Common Core discriminates against non-native English speakers and children with autism for the way it requires English comprehension in addition to mathematical ability (pp. 68-71), the author is at his best when providing a close critique of how the Common Core functions in practice.

In moving beyond a specific critique of the Common Core and arguing for local control, however, Tampio forgets to stop and ask, "Well, who would wield power then?" And the answer is not always those we want. He makes his case using a Madisonian perspective on local control and federalism, but this makes more sense when thinking about divisions of power between local and federal governments, and less so when the concern is the monopolization of power by particular factions (p. 28), either at the local or federal level. Local control is no panacea for a more democratic education policymaking. Tampio is correct in calling for democratic deliberation over educational standards (pp. 33, 36, 54), but this concern is orthogonal to that of local control, which is just as prone to elite capture as national standards.

These two books deserve to be read together. While *The Color of Mind* is sharply focused on what educators can do inside of schools, *Common Core* turns its attention to the larger political struggle of how our schools should be organized. *The Color of Mind* repeatedly reminds the reader that many of the problems in schools are beyond the power of educators to fix, arguing that "[s]erious societal problems are for *all Americans* to address in the political and legal arena. . . . Such problems are *clearly beyond the capacity and authority of schools and their leaders to wholly resolve*" (p. 110; emphasis added). *Common Core* provides a useful reminder of how educators—together with parents, and civil society—*should be* engaged in a larger political process of how schools, curricula, and national standards are organized. You cannot have one (dignitary justice), without the other (the engagement of educators inside and outside of the house of learning). It is this fact one wishes had been given greater attention in the *The Color of Mind*. At the same time, this book provides useful correctives to *Common Core*. With its razor-sharp focus on the latest attempts at setting national education standards (there will likely be more), the reader gets the impression from Tampio's argument that these policies are sui generis. Yet they are not, and remembering that such policies have a long history before this latest attempt would help us better understand why the Common Core is so problematic.

These two books should be read by political scientists for their impassioned cases for the improvement of

American education. They both echo T. H. Marshall's claim that education is the right of the future adult to have been educated. Most importantly, they address concerns that lie at the heart of our discipline: How should scarce resources be distributed? Who should wield power? And how should future citizens be educated?

Dangerous Minds: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Return of the Far Right. By Ronald Beiner. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 176p. $24.95 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718002980

— Bernard Yack, *Brandeis University*

Ronald Beiner's *Dangerous Minds* is a timely little book about how we should deal with provocative thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger in the midst of the current revival of rightwing radicalism. It is aimed at a broad audience of educated readers rather than specialists on the subject, for Beiner believes that the politically sanitized version of Nietzsche and Heidegger favored by most of those specialists is blinding us to the dangerous currents that their work is now stirring up. So he takes us on a quick tour of the pronouncements of some ideological stars of what he calls the growing "neo-Fascist International"—Richard Spencer, Aleksandr Durgin, Julius Evola—and links them to core ideas in Nietzsche's and Heidegger's thought. Beiner then develops these ideas in the book's two main chapters, which are designed "to open our eyes, at once intellectually, politically and morally, to just how dangerous they are" (p. 14).

Beiner's impatient and at times polemical style in this book is fueled by his assessment of the current political scene. Now that the post-war moratorium on the public expression of fascist-sounding ideals seems to be coming to an end, he believes that ignoring the plain meaning of Nietzsche's political words is a luxury we can no longer afford. When the *reductio ad Hitlerum* was an effective conversation stopper, it was fun to play with friendlier and more familiar Nietzsches, the post-modern ironist or the joyful navel-gazer. Now, for Beiner, that seems like fiddling while Rome is being set ablaze.

As in the previous paragraph, I shall focus my comments in this review on Beiner's account of Nietzsche. Not that his treatment of Heidegger is unfair or uninteresting. It is just that Nietzsche's ideas have an immensely wider reach than Heidegger's, both nowadays and during earlier waves of right wing radicalism. Heidegger is so much more an educated, even academic taste. You cannot imagine any army preparing a collection of his sayings for their soldiers to carry into war, as the Nazis did with Nietzsche. (The little book, designed to fit into a soldier's knapsack, was called *Sword of the Spirit: Words for German Soldiers and Strugglers*.) Also, dealing with Heidegger inevitably raises questions of character—Why did he decide to join the Nazis? Why did he never really renounce them?—that deflect from Beiner's primary focus on the dangerous implications of ideas. In this sense, the book might have done better by focusing exclusively on Nietzsche, especially given his massive influence on Heidegger.

Beiner places a rather narrow frame around Nietzsche's ideas, following Heidegger's suggestion that every great thinker has a "single thought." Needless to say, that is a bit of an exaggeration. But it does help him show that Nietzsche was much more of a hedgehog than the fox you might expect from someone who tossed off thousands of wildly inconsistent aphorisms. Beiner's frame is well-chosen: Nietzsche's diagnosis of what he saw as the "sickness" of modern culture, a culture that systematically undermines the horizons and sense of rank that Nietzsche believes that a culture needs in order to be life-affirming. Nietzsche developed this diagnosis early in his career and spun out ever deeper variations on it for the rest of his life. It sets him squarely against both Christianity and the Enlightenment and makes him an enemy of both the open society and egalitarianism. Beiner may exaggerate the extent to which the Enlightenment's legacy pushes us in the direction of egalitarian morals. (To my mind, the Enlightenment pushes us, both in theory and in practice, toward meritocracy and technocracy as much as or more than it pushes us toward democracy.) But Nietzsche shares Beiner's understanding of the Enlightenment, not mine. So framing him as a fierce enemy of the Enlightenment's commitment to egalitarianism and the open society is both accurate and useful.

But I find it hard to agree with Beiner's conclusion that Nietzsche's cultural diagnosis turns Nietzsche into an "ultra-reactionary," who, like Joseph de Maistre, is looking to restore what was lost with the French Revolution. Setting Nietzsche beside someone like de Maistre, the arch-defender of Catholic orthodoxy and legitimacy, should in itself render that conclusion questionable. Opposing the Enlightenment and equality does not commit you to the restoration of something like the ancien regime unless, as Tocqueville argued so insistently, democracy and old regime aristocracy are the only two real political choices before us. But that, it seems to me, is precisely what Nietzsche—as well as many of his fellow "third way" followers—is intent on denying. Nietzsche would not only dismiss Tocqueville as another weak-willed modern seduced by Christian moralism, as Beiner suggests. He would also dismiss the confidence with which Tocqueville tells us that history has a direction, let alone which direction it is moving.

Tocqueville shared Nietzsche's diagnosis that much of what is most valuable about individual and cultural achievement would be lost with the passing of the ancient regime. But he was reconciled to that loss by his belief that there was only one way of organizing aristocracy and that history was leaving that form of organization behind.